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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
RONALD BARKHORN, ET AL. *
Plaintiffs *
*
v. * CIVIL NO. SKG-10-750*
PORTS AMERICAN CHESAPEAKE, LLC*
Defendant. *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, Ronald Barkhorn, John Delawder, Richard 
Delawder, Michael Shultz, and James Ruff, are former and current 
employees of defendant, Ports America Chesapeake, LLC ("PAC"). 
(ECF No. 83, 10-11). Plaintiffs filed suit against PAC on March 
25, 2010.(ECF No. 1). The current amended complaint alleges 
violations of the associational provision of Title I of the ADA, 
retaliatory treatment following Barkhorn's EEOC filing, race 
discrimination under Title VII, disability discrimination under 
Maryland law, and violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
including associational discrimination violations. (ECF No.
83).
On March 25, 2011, PAC filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs' ADA claim lacked merit. 
(ECF No. 36-1, 24-26). By order dated September 26, 2011, the 
Court granted PAC's motion with respect to plaintiffs' Title VII
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claim without prejudice,1 and limited plaintiffs' ADA claims of 
associational discrimination to discrimination occurring on or 
after January 1, 2009, but denied summary judgment as to all 
other claims. (ECF No. 104).
On January 11, 2012, PAC filed the pending motion for 
summary judgment against Richard Delawder, asserting four 
grounds. (ECF No. 116). First, based on the prior ruling that 
no ADA associational right existed prior to January 1, 2009, 
defendant argues that Mr. Delawder has no ADA associational 
claim because he retired on June 30, 2008. Defendant argues that 
the prior ruling bars Richard Delawder's associational claims 
under the Rehabilitation Act as well as the ADA. (ECF No. 116­
1, 5). However, the defendant did not move for summary judgment 
on the Rehabilitation Act claim. Moreover, the Court's prior 
ruling as to the January 1, 2009 cut-off date was limited to the 
ADA. (See ECF No. 103, 11-14; ECF No. 104). (ECF No. 116-1, 4­
6). Second, the defendant argues that Mr. Delawder's claim 
under the Rehabilitation Act is similarly without merit, as it 
is subject to the same interpretation as the ADA. Third, 
defendant challenges Delawder's associational claims under
1 Plaintiffs conceded that they failed to administratively 
exhaust their claim of racial discrimination under Title VII 
prior to filing the case, and requested that this claim be 
dismissed without prejudice. (ECF No. 103, 4). The Court did 
so.
2
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Maryland law, contending that the Maryland anti-discrimination 
statute, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't § 20-606(a), does not contain 
a cause of action for associational discrimination. (ECF No. 
116-1, 6). Last, defendant argues that Richard Delawder's 
retaliation claim lacks merit because he retired before Barkhorn 
filed the EEOC charges. (Id. at 7).
Mr. Delawder's response only addresses defendant's first 
argument. He contends that the prior ruling as to ADA 
associational discrimination, upon which defendant's first 
argument rests, conflicts with applicable case law and 
regulations. (ECF No. 124, 2).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES IN PART 
and GRANTS IN PART PAC's motion.
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 
dispute remains "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The only facts
that are properly considered "material" are those that might 
affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. The 
party moving for summary judgment has the burden of 
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.
3
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 
F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). Where there are no factual 
issues pertinent to the defendant’s motion on the principal 
claims in dispute, the Court must determine whether summary 
judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); see also Nixon Uniform Service, Inc. v. American 
Directory Service Agency, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 367, 368 (D. Md.
1988).
II. Discussion
There are no disputes of fact before the Court. The issues 
raised are purely legal, and the Court rules on each as a matter 
of law.
A. Associational Discrimination Under the ADA
First, the Court must determine whether Mr. Delawder's ADA 
associational discrimination claims are foreclosed based on this 
Court's prior ruling that ADA associational discrimination 
claims are limited to pre-January 1, 2009 actions. For the 
reasons set forth below, and pursuant to this Court's authority 
under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Court hereby amends the prior ruling as to pre-2009 ADA 
associational discrimination claims, and denies summary judgment 
as to those claims.
The Court finds that Congress intended to prohibit 
associational discrimination as part of the original 1990 ADA
4
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Act.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) prohibits discrimination by 
"excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a 
qualified individual because of the known disability of an 
individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a 
relationship or association[.]"2 (emphasis added). This clause 
was part of the original ADA as enacted in 1990. See P.L. 101­
336, §102(b)(4), 104 Stat. 327, 332 (1990). The original ADA
also included the following provision in § 12112(a) of the same 
section:
No covered entity shall discriminate against 
a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual 
in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment.
P.L. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 327, 331-32 (1990)
(emphasis added). The conflict in the plain language between 
subsection (b)(4) and the original subsection (a) is 
apparent. In 2008, § 12112(a) was amended to read as 
follows:
No covered entity shall discriminate against 
a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability in regard to job application 2
2 The ADA defines a qualified individual as "an individual who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such 
individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
5
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procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); P.L. 110-325, §§ 5(1)(a) and 8, 122 Stat.
3553, 3557, 3559 (2008). This new language, of course,
recognizes discrimination against a qualified individual due to
the disability of others, not simply the disability of the
qualified individual himself or herself. The amendment
reconciled the apparent conflict between subsection (b)(4) and
subsection (a).
However, under accepted principles of statutory 
interpretation, the statute, prior to the amendment is properly 
read as establishing a claim of associational discrimination 
when originally passed. First, the canon of statutory 
interpretation known as generalia specialibus non derogant, 
meaning general provisions do not qualify specific ones, applies 
here. See, e.g., Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512, 3 S.
Ct. 357, 27 L. Ed. 1012 (1883) (noting that when "general and
specific provisions" are "in apparent contradiction, whether in 
the same or different statutes," the specific will "qualify . .
. the general"); S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control v. 
Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 245, 258 (4th Cir. 2004)
("Pursuant to elementary principles of statutory construction, 
unless the legislature has indicated that it intends otherwise,
6
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a specific statutory provision controls a more general one."). 
Subsection (a) of § 12112 states the "[g]eneral rule" while 
subsection (b) sets out the "[c]onstruction [of the general 
rule.]" See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b). Subsection (b)(4) 
pertains explicitly and specifically to associational 
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). Thus, where the 
question of associational discrimination before 2009 is 
concerned, subsection (b)(4) takes precedence over subsection 
(a).
Second, considering § 12112 as a whole, not just focusing
on § 12112(a), similarly results in a finding of associational
discrimination. The leading treatise on statutory
interpretation explains that
A statute is passed as a whole and not in 
parts or sections and is animated by one 
general purpose and intent. Consequently, 
each part of section should be construed in 
connection with every other part or section 
to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is 
not proper to confine interpretation to the 
one section to be construed.
2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 46:5 (7th ed.). In Hartog v. Wasatch Academy,
the Tenth Circuit properly employed this principle in its
analysis of subsection (b)(4) and pre-amendment subsection (a):
Title I of the ADA, which governs employment 
relationships, generally provides that "no 
covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability
7
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because of the disability of such individual 
in regard to . . . discharge of employees .
. . and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(a) (1994) (footnote added). This
provision, standing alone, would provide no 
protection to Den Hartog, who does not 
suffer from any disability. Section 
102(b) (4) of the ADA, however, defines 
"discriminate" to include "excluding or 
otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to 
a qualified individual because of the known 
disability of an individual with whom the 
qualified individual is known to have a 
relationship or association." 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b) (4) (1994) (emphasis added) (the
"association provision”).
129 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit did not negate any statutory 
provision, but harmonized these two statutory provisions, as 
principles of statutory construction demand.
Third, the amendment should be applied retroactively, in
any event. The determination of whether the amendment to
subsection (a) applies retroactively turns on whether the
amendment was a "clarifying amendment" or a "substantive
amendment." As explained in Sutherland,
courts presume that provisions added by [an] 
amendment which affect substantive rights 
are intended to operate prospectively. Where 
the change in the law is 'substantive' 
rather than 'procedural,' a presumption of 
prospectivity can be rebutted only by the
act itself........ However . . . when the
purpose of amendment is to clarify the 
meaning of an earlier enactment, . . .
provisions added by amendment that affect 
procedural rights—legal remedies—apply to
8
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all cases pending at the time of its 
enactment and all those commenced 
subsequently. This is true whether the
substantive rights sought to be enforced 
accrued prior or subsequent to the 
amendment, unless a vested right would be 
impaired by the amendment.
1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 22:36 (7th ed.); see also Brown v. Thompson, 374 
F.3d 253, 259 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In 
other words, a clarifying amendment is given retroactive effect, 
while a substantive amendment is not. The amendment to 
subsection (a) was clearly intended to resolve the conflict with 
subsection (b)(4), and was not substantive. Thus, it applies 
retroactively.
In sum, the Court finds that the language of § 12112, when 
analyzed under these principles of statutory construction, 
clearly and unambiguously permits a cause of action for pre-2009 
associational discrimination, and this Court "must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984).
Additionally, this construction is consistent with the
expert view of the EEOC, the federal agency administering the
law in its regulations:
It is unlawful for a covered entity to 
exclude or deny equal jobs or benefits to, 
or otherwise discriminate against, a
9
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qualified individual because of the known 
disability of an individual with whom the 
qualified individual is known to have a 
family, business, social or other 
relationship or association.
29 C.F.R. 1630.8. The regulation was promulgated in 1991, long 
before the amendment to § 12112. See 56 F.R. 35726 (1991).
Thus, even if § 12112 was ambiguous on its face prior to 2009 
(and, again, the Court concludes that it was not), this Court 
would defer to EEOC expertise as expressed in 29 C.F.R. 1630.8 
and conclude that Congress intended a cause of action for 
associational discrimination before 2009. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 843 (holding that if a statute is silent or ambiguous, courts 
must defer to the administering agency's interpretation of the 
statute so long as the interpretation is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute).
Finally, several pre-2009 federal appellate decisions have 
reached this conclusion, albeit with little discussion. See A 
Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 515 F.3d 356, 
363-64 (4th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that ADA Titles I and III3 
explicitly permit associational discrimination causes of action, 
and holding that Title II also does in certain circumstances);
3 Section 12112(b)(4) is part of Title I of the ADA, which 
prohibits discrimination in the employment setting. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Title II prohibits disability 
discrimination in public services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131­
12165. Title III applies to public accommodations for disabled 
persons. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182-12189.
10
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Fonner v. Fairfax County, VA, 415 F.3d 325, 332-33 (4th Cir. 
2005) (acknowledging a cause of action for ADA Titles I and II, 
but providing no holding as to Title II); Freilich v. Upper 
Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(acknowledging a cause of action for associational 
discrimination under ADA Title I, and looking to that provision 
for guidance even though suit was brought under Title III);
Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. and Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 
59-61 (4th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging existence of Title I ADA 
associational discrimination cause of action, but granting 
summary judgment after finding no triable issues of fact as to 
the employer's knowledge of alleged disability); Tyndall v.
Nat'l Educ. Centers, 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging ADA Title I associational discrimination cause of 
action but finding no liability under the facts of that case).
Accordingly, and pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Court's prior 
determination as to pre-2009 associational discrimination claims 
is hereby revised to permit such claims to proceed. Consistent 
with that revision, defendant's motion for summary judgment as 
to Delawder's ADA associational discrimination claim is DENIED.
B. Associational Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation 
Act
Defendant appears to concede that even though the 
Rehabilitation Act does not contain an explicit associational
11
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discrimination clause, the Act does generally permit a cause of 
action for associational discrimination. (ECF No. 116-1, 5-6) 
(citing Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 38 F. 
Supp. 2d 91, 100 n.3 (D.P.R. 1999), aff'd, 214 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 
2000)). However, defendant argues that the prior decision as to 
pre-2009 claims under the ADA also bars Mr. Delawder's pre-2009 
claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, 
reasoning that "[t]he standards used to determine whether an 
employer has been discriminated [against] under the 
Rehabilitation Act are the same standards applied under the 
ADA." (ECF No. 116-1, 5; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (”[T]he
standards used to determine whether [Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a complaint alleging 
employment discrimination under this section shall be the 
standards applied under Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.")).
This argument fails because the prior decision on which it 
hinges has been revised to permit pre-2009 associational 
discrimination claims under the ADA. In any event, the prior 
decision as to the pre-2009 issues was limited to the ADA, (ECF 
No. 103, 11-14), and rightly so. The language conflict between 
subsection (b)(4) and the subsection (a) was confined to the 
ADA. There was no parallel conflict within the Rehabilitation 
Act. Indeed, the Rehabilitation Act does not even contain an
12
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explicit associational discrimination clause. See 29 U.S.C. § 
701. Moreover, and as discussed in Part A, despite that 
apparent conflict, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged a cause of 
action for pre-2009 associational discrimination under the ADA. 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's recognition of pre-2009 associational 
discrimination under the ADA would strongly suggest - indeed 
arguably compel - recognition of pre-2009 associational 
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.4 Thus, summary 
judgment as to associational discrimination under the 
Rehabilitation Act is DENIED.
C. Associational Discrimination Under Maryland Law 
Defendant argues that Mr. Delawder lacks a cause of action 
for associational discrimination under the Maryland anti­
discrimination statute, Md. State Gov't Code Ann., § 20-606, 
because, unlike the ADA, the Maryland statute does not contain 
an explicit cause of action for associational discrimination. 
(ECF No. 116-1, 6). Defendant argues further that § 20-606 
refers only to an employer's inability to do some action because 
of the individual's disability or other salient trait. However, 
defendant provides no authority for this argument. Mr. Delawder
4 The Court is not aware of any Fourth Circuit decisions 
recognizing associational discrimination under the 
Rehabilitation Act. Defendant did not provide any case law, in 
any Circuit, to support an argument that the Rehabilitation Act 
does not include associational discrimination, before or after 
January 11, 2009.
13
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has failed to respond to defendant's position.
In relevant part, § 20-606(a) provides as follows:
(a) Employers. -- An employer may not:
(1) fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or 
otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to the individual's 
compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because of:
(i) the individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, age, national origin, 
marital status, sexual orientation, 
genetic information, or disability 
unrelated in nature and extent so as to 
reasonably preclude the performance of the 
employment . . . .
Md. State Gov't Code Ann., § 20-606(a) (emphasis added). 
Maryland courts have hardly explored the question of 
associational discrimination. Indeed, the undersigned found 
only one Maryland case addressing the issue—Gutwein v. Easton 
Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974). There, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals held in the context of a race 
discrimination case that "instances of discrimination in 
employment involving . . . the termination of a white
complainant's employment because of his association with his 
black fiancee are plainly within the contemplation and coverage 
of §19(a)[,]" id. at 567, which is the predecessor of § 20- 
606(a). See 2009 Md. Laws 120. Thus, the Court of Appeals has 
recognized a cause of action for associational discrimination
14
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under §20-606(a) despite the absence of an explicit 
associational provision in the statute.
Accordingly, summary judgment on the basis of associational 
discrimination under Maryland law is DENIED.
D. Retaliation Claims
Lastly, defendant argues that Mr. Delawder lacks a cause of 
action for retaliatory conduct in response to Barkhorn's EEOC 
filing. (ECF No. 116-1, 7). Mr. Delawder voluntarily retired 
from PAC on June 30, 2008 because he was suffering from health 
problems and disliked the work allocation policies. (ECF No. 93­
2, 2, 4). The retirement occurred before Barkhorn filed charges 
with the EEOC for disability and age discrimination on December 
17, 2008. Therefore, as a temporal matter, Mr. Delawder could 
not have been the victim of any retaliatory conduct by PAC in 
response to the EEOC filing.
Thus, defendant's summary judgment as to Mr. Delawder's 
retaliation claims is GRANTED.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES summary judgment as 
to Mr. Delawder's associational discrimination claims under the 
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Maryland law, but GRANTS 
summary judgment as to Mr. Delawder's retaliation claim.
Date: 6/14/12 /s/
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Susan K. Gauvey
United States Magistrate Judge
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